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A growing body of research has focused on the development of assistive 
devices to improve the recovery and ameliorate the quality of life of people 
suffering from spinal cord injuries (SCI). In their stimulating and timely paper, 
Pazzaglia and Molinari [1] review the significant progress made by 
biotechnology studies in providing increasing sophisticated assistive tools such 
as robotic legs (e.g., prostheses and exoskeletons) that extend the functionality of 
patients’ bodies. However, despite this extraordinary technological effort [2], it 
remains uncertain how these devices can be appropriately embedded into the 
mental representation of the body. Here, we wish to amplify the points raised by 
Pazzaglia and Molinari by discussing three challenges facing work on embodying 
prostheses raised by experimental research on body representation. 
 Pazzaglia and Molinari discuss prostheses in relation both to tool use and 
to illusions of ownership such as the rubber hand illusion. As has been noted by 
many authors, however, the subjective experience of wielding a tool is quite 
different from that of experiencing ownership over a limb [3,4]. Indeed, as 
Povinelli and colleagues [5] observe, in many cases the whole point of using a 
tool is that the action performed is something that the body cannot itself do (as 
when using a knife to slice vegetables) or which would be dangerous to do 
unaided (as when using a poker to stoke a fire). In such circumstances, it is 
critical to maintain the distinction between the tool and the body, in contrast to 
cases such as the rubber hand illusion in which the rubber hand appears to 
replace the participant’s own hand [6]. Thus, it is important to consider whether 
a prosthesis is primarily meant to be a tool, a replacement for the missing limb, 
or both, as these might lead to very different implications for the design and 
functioning of prostheses.  
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A recent study by Luke Miller and his colleagues [7] is particularly 
intriguing in this context. They found that the plastic changes induced by tool-
use on tactile distance perception are modulated by the morphological similarity 
between the tool and the body. When participants used a long, thin claw to grab 
objects, plastic changes were observed on the forearm – but not on the hand. In 
contrast, when they used a large hand-shaped tool, changes were observed on 
the hand – but not on the arm. This double-dissociation suggests that the 
embodiment of tools is not driven solely by their functionality, but also depends 
on the similarity in form between the tool and the body. This result has clear 
implications for prosthetics and exoskeletons in which the relation between the 
form of the prosthesis and that of the body varies widely. It also points to the 
critical role of vision in integrating the multiple sensory signals coming from the 
body and raises the question of how the functional utility of the prosthesis as a 
tool and its aesthetic character as a replacement for the lost limb should be 
balanced.  
 Another intriguing issue in the context of prosthetics is interoception, our 
perception of our body from the inside. Recent research has highlighted the 
critical role of interoception in representation of the body and self [8,9]. By their 
nature, prostheses are perceived exteroceptively – from the outside – rather 
than interoceptively – from the inside. This has potentially important 
implications for how they are experienced and incorporated into representations 
of the body. Two recent studies, however, have shown that interoceptive signals 
can enhance the embodiment of external objects [10,11]. Suzuki and colleagues 
[10] used augmented-reality to create a ‘cardiac rubber hand illusion’, finding 
that ownership was enhanced by visual modulation of the colour of the virtual 
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hand time-locked to the participant’s heartbeats. Aspell and colleagues [11] 
found similar results using the full-body illusion. It is an intriguing possibility 
that such methods could be used to provide a form of interoceptive experience 
over prosthetic limbs or exoskeletons, allowing them to move beyond being a 
tool to being an integral part of the bodily self. 
 The final issue we wish to discuss concerns the time-course of 
embodiment. One puzzle about research on the plasticity of body representation 
is how to reconcile findings such as the rubber hand illusion showing rapid 
modulation of the experience of embodiment in simply laboratory settings with 
phenomena such as phantom limbs in which the experience of the body appears 
stubbornly resistant to alteration, even in the face of a massive change to the 
physical structure of the body [12]. Prosthetics limbs and exoskeletons are a 
particularly intriguing case in which plasticity might occur over multiple time-
scales: rapidly as the user puts the prosthesis on and off on an hourly or daily 
basis, and slowly as the user develops expertise with and embodies the 
prosthesis over weeks or months of use. 
This is an exciting time for research on assistive devices, as clearly described 
by Pazzaglia and Molinari. Together, the issues we have discussed show both the 
importance of experimental research on embodiment to the development of 
effective assistive devices and the fascinating implications of prostheses for 
understand basic issues about the nature of the bodily self. Understanding the 
mechanisms that determine the embodiment of external objects as part of our 
body is a pressing research goal. This will allow artificial devises such as 
prostheses and exoskeletons to be built so that they can be fully welcomed by 
the bodily self. 
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